Abstract
Introduction
Given the important role that information technology plays in offshored and distributed work, it is no surprise that organizations and information systems scholars have paid close attention to how IT enables and constrains the flow of knowledge and information across time and space. Two types of IT in particular have dominated researchers' attention: communication and storage technologies (Alavi and Tiwana 2002; Malhotra and Majchrzak 2005) . Phones, e-mail, chat rooms, and other communication technologies primarily serve as conduits for messages containing knowledge and information. Storage technologies such as knowledge management systems and version control systems permit storage, retrieval, and sharing of knowledge and information that is explicitly codified (Davenport and Prusak 1998) .
The attention paid to these two types of IT has revealed problems of knowledge transfer that plague individuals working across time and space. Researchers have found that communication technologies inadequately convey contextual cues and consequently impede separated individuals from establishing mutual knowledge (Cramton 2001) , sharing unique knowledge (Griffith et al. 2003; Hollingshead 1996) , and deciphering new knowledge (Alavi and Tiwana 2002) . Storage technologies similarly foster problems: Because these technologies store decontextualized knowledge (Dibbern et al. 2004; Majchrzak et al. 2005 ) that is communicated asynchronously (Montoya-Weiss et al. 2001) , individuals who later retrieve the knowledge struggle to appropriately apply it (Sole and Edmondson 2002) and to integrate it into their streams of action (Kirkman and Law 2005) . Researchers seek to address these problems by developing new IT that can convey context (Boland et al. 1994) and by incorporating contextualization into team communication strategies (Te'eni 2001) .
In addition to communication and storage technologies, a third type of IT facilitates the offshoring or distribution of much knowledge-intensive work, but its role in knowledge and information transfer has received scant research attention to date. This third type of IT, which we call transformational technologies, affords the creation, modification, and manipulation of digital artifacts in the process of converting input into output. Whereas communication and storage technologies are meant to transmit and store artifacts with little alteration of their content, form, or purpose, transformational technologies are designed to output artifacts that are distinctly different in content, form, or purpose from the original input. Examples of transformational technologies include spreadsheet applications and word processing technologies that individuals use to convert input like handwritten notes into budgets and reports. Transformational technologies also encompass sophisticated mathematics-based information technologies such as computer-aided engineering (CAE) technologies, which are used to transform input from computeraided design (CAD) drawings, including physical dimensions, location coordinates, and material properties, into computational models for analysis. Transformational technologies are becoming increasingly important in offshored and distributed work because, in the course of transforming input into output, they allow collaborative authoring (Malhotra et al. 2001) , transmission and storage of knowledge (Thurk and Fine 2003) , and shared access to common information (Thomke 2006) .
When used to accomplish work across time and space, transformational technologies are often employed in conjunction with communication and storage technologies, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Individuals may send task requests and inquiries via communication technologies; they may even send task artifacts, as in the case of e-mail attachments or file transfer protocols. Alternatively, messages sent by communication technologies may simply provide pointers to artifacts in storage technologies. But whereas communication technologies may serve as the transport mechanism for task products and storage technologies may serve as their repositories, transformational technologies provide the mechanisms for creating, viewing, modifying, and analyzing a large range of knowledge artifacts. In short, offshored or distributed work does not end when a message is sent or a file is stored or retrieved. Rather, work is often begun and continues through the use of transformational technologies, whose output embodies task-critical knowledge and information for further communication and data storage in a cycle of ongoing work.
Despite the important role played by transformational technologies in facilitating offshored and distributed work, they are often overlooked by researchers. Malone and Crowston's (1994) early attempt to construct a taxonomy of collaborativework technologies included only communication technologies and a variety of groupware, such as meeting scheduling technologies and electronic meeting rooms. More recently, in a study of 54 distributed teams covering a range of industries and projects, Majchrzak et al. (2005) detailed the technologies that teams employed to support their virtual collaboration; the resulting list covered a range of communication and storage technologies, but almost no transformational technologies (application sharing programs came the closest). In a study of 
Figure 1. Flow of Knowledge and Information in Offshored or Distributed Work
globally distributed software development teams, Cramton and Webber (2005) reported that teams employed e-mail, Lotus Notes, telephone, databases, and video and telephone conferencing in their work across national boundaries; transformational technologies were absent from this list. In general, studies of offshored and distributed work tend to focus on team processes of communication and coordination and their associated technologies rather than on domainspecific task processes and the technologies employed to carry them out (Hinds and Bailey 2003; Martins et al. 2004; Maruping and Agarwal 2004; Powell et al. 2004) .
In this paper, we add to the literature of knowledge transfer problems in offshored and distributed work by investigating how individuals contend with problems that arise from the use of transformational technologies across time and space. To begin, we draw upon the literature on distributed teams and on IT outsourcing and offshoring to argue that the problems associated with transformational technologies are likely to differ from those identified for communication and storage technologies. Thus, to fully understand the potential obstacles associated with offshoring or distributing knowledge-intensive work, researchers needs to include in their purview the entire suite of information technologies that individuals employ.
Theoretical Background
Before transformational technologies became commonplace in many occupations, it was difficult or impossible for individuals in different places to work together on the same task because there were few mechanisms for sharing task artifacts. As a result, large chunks of work were assigned to collocated groups to reduce interdependencies across time and space. Work was typically offshored or distributed if it could be divided at functional boundaries, thus reducing the need for coordination (Kotabe and Swan 1994) . For example, the U.S automotive industry for many years has sent the entirety of engineering design work for particular vehicles offshore, thereby reducing the need for collaborative task work and requiring only the delivery of the end product: a completely engineered vehicle (Clark and Fujimoto 1991) . In work that is offshored or distributed in this manner, individuals working across time, space, and function often have problems bridging differences in their occupational knowledge and work practices. Problems routinely occur, for example, when individuals fail to convey function-specific contextual knowledge, such as time constraints, requirements, or goals (Alavi and Tiwana 2002; Cramton 2001) . To overcome these problems, these groups need to develop a common, highly abstract knowledge base so that each member can understand all of the functional domains well enough for the group to work together.
Transformational technologies are dramatically reshaping the way offshoring occurs by permitting the global distribution of work within, rather than only across, functions. Because these technologies can digitize work artifacts (e.g., financial spreadsheets or scientific reports), work becomes portable in ways that it has not been in the past. By permitting the electronic transmission of artifacts and thereby enabling individuals at geographically disparate sites to work on shared task products, digitization makes offshoring possible at the task level within functions. In automotive engineering, for example, transformational technologies enable the offshoring of tasks that take mere hours, such as building computational models, rather than offshoring the whole of engineering design work. This new form of distributed work-which we term task-based offshoring-brings with it new implications for knowledge transfer. These implications arise, in part, from the type of knowledge that transformational technologies embody.
Like communication and storage technologies, transformational technologies may embody explicit knowledge, as studies of scientists and laboratories have made clear (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Pickering 1995) . A spreadsheet with embedded formulas that compute values based upon data entry, for example, embodies the explicit knowledge that is represented in the formulas, such as simple trigonometric functions. Unlike these other technologies, transformational technologies have the further potential to embody implicit knowledge. We use the term implicit in the manner proposed by Griffith, Sawyer and Neale (2003) , who construe implicit knowledge as lying between explicit and tacit knowledge: Implicit knowledge is not currently declarative like explicit knowledge, but, unlike tacit knowledge, could be made so. Implicit knowledge is often embodied in an artifact's structure or features. For example, a model built in a finite element analysis software program might feature small rectangular shapes in one area and large ones elsewhere, a difference that would suggest that analyses are intended for the area with the smaller shapes (whose size facilitates more precise computations). The implicit knowledge embodied by transformational technologies is helpful because artifacts are often created, viewed, and manipulated within these technologies absent clear documentation of how they were created, what assumptions they reflect, or their intended use. Gleaning this kind of information from an artifact typically requires interpretation of embodied implicit knowledge on the part of a knowledgeable user (Thurk and Fine 2003) .
In the context of transformational technologies, problems of transferring knowledge and information across time and space thus appear likely to arise from sending artifacts created with these technologies and trusting in the recipient's correct interpretation of the knowledge embodied in the artifacts. These problems are distinct from issues of mutual knowledge creation that involve conveying context-dependent knowledge and translating one's unique occupational knowledge into terms that others can understand. The knowledge transfer problems associated with transformational technologies concern a skill (the ability to interpret the implicit knowledge associated with artifacts routinely created and modified within an occupation) that is a reflection of one's occupational knowledge. Whereas problems in mutual knowledge creation and the sharing of contextual information, because they often arise across occupational and functional domains, are generally viewed as problems in communication and coordination (Cramton 2001; Hinds and Bailey 2003; Majchrzak et al. 2005; Weisband 2002) , an inability to interpret implicit knowledge in artifacts could be construed as lacking adequate technical knowledge to perform the work. Because the supplier's technical knowledge is critical to the success of an offshoring relationship (Beath and Walker 1998) , such a conclusion could have severe ramifications. Consequently, problems in interpreting implicit knowledge may resonate more broadly in task-based offshoring than in cross-functional offshoring, in which only a general understanding of the domain knowledge possessed by members of other functions is needed and hence the interpretation of knowledge encoded in the artifacts produced with transformational technologies may not be expected or important (Star and Griesemer 1989) .
The IT outsourcing and offshoring literature most often views a dearth of knowledge on the supplier's side as an inadequate understanding of firm-specific work practices, business needs, and specifications, not insufficient occupational knowledge that is more universal in nature (Dibbern et al. 2004) . Because time spent bringing the offshore employees "up to speed" on the home site's practices and processes is costly (Barthélemy and Geyer 2001; Pfannenstein and Tsai 2002) authors have recommended a number of methods for quicker knowledge transfer. Rottman and Lacity (2004) suggested that the home site send representatives to the offshore site to provide intense training in work methodologies and technologies. Having offshore workers spend several months at the home site is also recommended (Morstead and Blount 2003) .
Several researchers have suggested that offshore sites send an on-site coordinator to the client site to shepherd the flow of knowledge offshore (Carmel 2006; Rottman and Lacity 2004) . Other approaches seek to reduce the problem through job selection or job design when planning offshored work, for example by only offshoring work for which necessary knowledge can be made fully explicit (Aron and Singh 2004) or by reengineering jobs to be offshored by decreasing their context-dependent content (Apte and Mason 1995) .
A study by Apte and Mason (1995) stands out in its recognition that the supplier's employees may have difficulty interpreting implicit knowledge in artifacts. In arguing that offshored jobs should be designed to have strong symbol manipulation content and little need for customer interaction or physical presence, Apte and Mason noted that it was necessary for the relevant symbols to be "packaged" in a movable medium and that the individual at the offshore site could "open the package, interpret the symbols and supply meaning and understanding to them" (p. 1256). A more frequent worry than the supplier's employees being able to interpret artifacts from the client is the possibility that, over time, the client may lose the technical knowledge necessary for completing the work (Clark et al. 1995; Duncan 1998; Takeishi 2001) . Consequently, determining how much the client learns during the relationship appears a more common interest to date than how much the supplier learns (Abraham et al. 1998; Goo et al. 2007 ).
Yet, the offshoring literature consistently shows that many task-based offshoring arrangements involve technical experts at the home site and far less experienced individuals at the offshore site (Carmel and Agarwal 2002; Lacity and Willcocks 2001) . This disparity in expertise raises the strong possibility that individuals who receive work offshore may not be able to interpret the knowledge embedded in artifacts by their expert and distant colleagues. More broadly, this disparity suggests that individuals at the offshore site may lack the necessary occupational knowledge and judgment, beyond simply the ability to interpret implicit knowledge embodied in artifacts, to undertake the work. For example, less experienced individuals may struggle simply to create appropriate artifacts on their own and to otherwise carry out tasks.
As a result, offshore employees may need to learn not just firm-specific work practices, needs, and specifications, but general occupational skills and knowledge. Until offshore employees gain such knowledge, individuals at the home site may find it necessary to thoroughly detail what is to be done and how, perhaps by making explicit the knowledge that is implicit in work artifacts sent offshore. In other words, the client may have to "spell out" more knowledge and information for tasks to be completed by the supplier. Depending on the capability of the transformational technology to facili- (Mackay et al. 2000; Oudshoorn et al. 2004; Pollock 2005 ).
In sum, overlooking transformational technologies in offshored and distributed work is problematic because doing so may obscure problems in transferring knowledge and information across time and space. To investigate these problems and how individuals contend with them, we compare two models of task-based offshoring. Both models feature experts at the home site and less experienced workers at the offshore site. One model has on-site coordinators who mediate between the home and offshore sites; the other model does not. Having an on-site coordinator to essentially broker knowledge transfer is the recommendation perhaps most commonly followed by firms (Farrell 2006) . Studies of knowledge brokering suggest that individuals who mediate between contexts separated by differences in expertise can translate knowledge in ways that make it palpable to less experienced individuals (Barley 1996; Bechky 2003; Hargadon and Sutton 1997) ; however, these studies were not conducted in an offshoring context in which working across time and space may make brokering difficult. We thus investigate the extent to which having a coordinator is helpful in providing occupational knowledge to offshore individuals and in aiding their interpretation of implicit knowledge embodied in artifacts created in transformational technologies. We also consider what new work practices individuals may develop to help in this endeavor.
We thus address three research questions: (1) What work practices are developed to help transfer occupational knowledge and to aid in the interpretation of implicit knowledge embodied in artifacts? (2) What role do coordinators play in these practices? (3) In the context of knowledge transfer problems and learning needs, how effective do individuals in the client and supplier sites perceive the offshoring arrangement to be?
Research Methods

Research Setting
We Figure 2 , when a Mexican PE wished to offshore a task to India, she had to first identify and contact the appropriate Indian PE. She arranged with this PE how the CAD and CAE models would be transferred, what tasks needed to be done, and by what date. Over the course of the assignment, the two engineers interacted until the Mexican PE was satisfied with the completed work. In effect, a Mexican PE worked with an Indian PE just as she would have an engineer who sat two desks away from her in Mexico. She may have simultaneously interacted with more than one Indian PE, perhaps because she had offshored two separate tasks.
By contrast, PEs under the U.S. center's arrangement, which we refer to as a gate-keeping model, were rarely in direct contact with Indian PEs. Instead, as illustrated in Figure 3 , U.S. and Indian PEs interacted through third party on-site coordinators. Upon receiving an offshoring request from a U.S. PE, the coordinator collected the relevant CAD and CAE models, wrote up a statement of requirements (SOR) to specify the tasks, and then sent the models and SOR to the Indian PE, whom he ensured understood the specifics of the request. Coordinators reviewed completed work as it was returned and summarized results for the U.S. PEs.
The coordinator role arose at the U.S. center because that center offshored tasks to India prior to the opening of the IAC India center. Before the center existed, U.S. PEs sent tasks to engineering consulting firms in India, each of which sent a representative to the U.S. center to serve as the conduit for work sent and received. When the center in India was established, these representatives from the Indian consulting firms, whose efforts the U.S. PEs deemed valuable, became coordinators in the U.S. model. Lacking this history of task-based offshoring, the Mexico center developed its own, more direct model for offshoring work to the India center.
U.S. managers considered the coordinator role superfluous and were working to dismantle it now that the Indian PEs worked within the IAC organization. In the minds of the managers, the two primary kinds of knowledge required to complete the PE tasks sent to India were, first, knowledge of how to operate the CAD and CAE technologies and, second, knowledge of how to interpret and act upon the implicit knowledge embodied in the artifacts created with those technologies. Managers believed that the second form of knowledge derived in part from knowing how to use the technologies and in part from fundamental engineering principles taught in university programs. Because Indian PEs held engineering degrees and were fully adept with the technologies, the U.S. managers believed that Indian PEs could complete the offshored tasks with little more information conveyed to them than the particularities of each assignment, which could be captured in a brief request form. From the U.S. managers' perspective, coordinators had been useful as intermediaries between IAC and external consulting firms, but were not needed with an internal, IAC-owned Indian center.
Knowledge differences in realms other than tool use, however, suggested that the offshoring of engineering tasks might require considerable knowledge transfer between sending and receiving PEs, thus providing coordinators with a possible role as knowledge brokers. The tenure of Indian PEs with IAC was shorter than most of their counterparts in the United States and Mexico, which meant they lacked certain firmspecific knowledge of work practices. Moreover, Indian PEs grew up in an era when automobiles were uncommon in India: Most Indian PEs were raised in families without a car, did not currently own a car; in many cases, they had never driven a car. Consequently, the product knowledge of the Indian PEs was far inferior to that of their colleagues abroad. These differences spoke to levels and types of expertise at the two sending centers in Mexico and the United States that was unmatched at the India center, a situation that gave rise to the possibility that organizational and product knowledge would need to be transferred across sites in the offshoring process. In addition, because the PEs at the India center had the same type and degree of university engineering education as their Mexican and U.S. counterparts (and thus possessed the formal knowledge deemed necessary to do this work), but as a group were younger and had less practical work experience, the likelihood of occupational knowledge transfer was also strong.
Data Collection and Analysis
Given the exploratory nature of this study, we followed the work of other researchers who have adopted an iterative approach to data collection and analysis (Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Majchrzak et al. 2000; Sutton and Hargadon 1996) . Our strategy was to collect initial data from observations and interviews of informants, analyze those data to determine what questions remained unanswered, and then employ other data collection methods to fill in the holes in our analysis. Table 1 summarizes, for each phase of our data collection details about the method, the informants or source, the topics explored, and the purpose of the data collection and analysis.
Phase 1: Collection and Analysis of Observation and Interview Data
Research has repeatedly shown that people have a difficult time articulating what work they do and how they do it (Collins 1974; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Orr 1996) . Therefore, we spent a total of 10.5 months conducting ethnographic observations for the purposes of understanding the activities that individuals routinely carried out to transfer knowledge and information between the sending and receiving sites. The first author spent 4 months (August through November 2005) observing PEs and coordinators at the U.S. center. He next spent 2.5 months (January through mid-March, 2006) observing the work of PEs at the Mexico center. Finally, both authors and a research assistant spent a total of 4 personmonths (mid-April through mid-July 2006) observing the work of PEs at the India service center. In total, we observed 6 PEs at the Mexico center, 12 PEs and 3 coordinators at the U.S. center, and 11 PEs at the India center.
During our observations, we wrote careful, detailed field notes in which we recorded the informant's every action, including his typed commands, conversations, tool usage, and use of documents and other work artifacts. We asked for screenshots when PEs worked on the computer, made photocopies of physical documents they employed (e.g., manuals, faxes), and described or sketched other artifacts (e.g., vehicle parts). We audio-recorded most conversations. After each session, we immediately expanded our running field notes, incorporating into them transcriptions of recorded conversations and full descriptions of the artifacts we had collected. The final record of action-dialogue interwoven with descriptions and images of artifacts keyed to the exact moment of their use-provided us with thorough documentation of work practices. To ensure we understood the work practices undertaken by each PE, we typically spent at least three sessions with each informant. We also conducted semi-structured interviews at each location to clarify activities documented in our observations and to gain a deeper understanding of why the activities were undertaken. We developed protocols for informants based on location (Mexico, United States, India) and job type (PE, coordinator, manager). Interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to 1 hour and were audio-recorded and later transcribed. In total, we conducted an interview with each of the three U.S. coordinators as well as 53 PEs and 9 managers across the three sites.
We analyzed the observation and interview data collected at each site immediately after ending our stay there. We chose this strategy of site-specific coding to help focus our data collection efforts at the next site (Perlow et al. 2004 ). To perform these analyses, we employed an inductive qualitative coding scheme. Starting with the U.S. observation and interview data, which were collected first, we began by examining the work of the coordinators, whose jobs wholly concerned the practice of offshoring. From multiple reads of our data, we developed a list of the types of activities the coordinators conducted. Examples of activities included "collect relevant information from DE," "place phone call to Indian PE to check on task status," and "inspect completed work received from India." We coded each instance of these activities in the observation and interview records. Next, we sorted coded activities into clusters based on similarity until we could identify a coherent set of work practices that coordinators employed in the offshoring of work (Strauss and Corbin 1998) . For example, we grouped activities such as "collect • Determine what aspects of returned work meet criteria • Ask Indian PE to redo aspects of returned work that fail to meet criteria or expectations task information," "define project," and "prepare SOR" into the work practice "defining requirements." The other work practices were "monitoring progress," "fixing returns," "routing tasks strategically," and "filtering quality." Table 2 lists the specific activities associated with each work practice. We describe the work practices in detail in the next section.
We used these practices derived from the coordinator data as codes with which to analyze the data collected on the work of PEs at the U.S center. We chose to use this iterative process because it is effective when one is attempting to uncover whether processes are similar or different across groups (Eisenhardt 1989; Lofland and Lofland 1995; Taylor and Trujillo 2001) . When we completed overlaying this coding scheme on the data for U.S. PEs, we went back through the data to determine if the PEs conducted additional offshoring practices that coordinators did not, but found none. We again employed this same coding scheme after completing observations and interviews with PEs in Mexico. To verify that we had not missed additional practices in the data we went back through the Mexico center data with an open-coding scheme (Strauss and Corbin 1998) . We uncovered no additional practices conducted by Mexican PEs.
Phase 2: Collection and Analysis of Survey Data
To confirm that the work practices identified in Phase 1 were commonly employed by all PEs at the Mexico and U.S. sites beyond the PEs that we observed and interviewed, we devised a survey instrument (Appendix A) to query PEs about their offshoring practices. Survey questions 1 and 2 asked for information on the number of years the PE had offshored tasks and the number of tasks that she had offshored, which we employed as control variables. Survey questions 3 through 7 asked PEs to rate on a 5-point scale the frequency with which they conducted a specific observed work practice when offshoring work to India. To prompt the respondents' recognition of the practice while keeping the survey length short enough to ensure completion, each question included a set of specific constituent activities that strongly reflected and accurately represented the practice as indicated by our Phase 1 analysis. 3 For example, question 3, "I spend a significant portion of time collecting information, defining projects, and preparing SORs to send to the India center," includes three specific activities that together make clear the work practice of "defining requirements." Questions 4 through 7 similarly listed specific activities for the remaining work practices. Survey questions 8, 9, and 10 asked respondents to assess the effectiveness of the offshoring arrangement via three key 3 By not asking about each activity separately, we could not verify statistically that the activities listed in Table 2 loaded onto their respective work practices as determined in our Phase 1 analysis. Although this choice is a limitation of our study, our primary intent was to gauge whether or not the practices were common among PEs, which necessitated a short survey to ensure completion by engineers facing tight deadlines. metrics that our observation and interview data indicated were reflective of PEs' expectations: (1) the quality of the task completed; (2) the speed with which the task was completed; and (3) the amount of time a PE saved by offshoring the task.
To determine the respondent pool for our survey, we asked U.S. coordinators for a complete list of PEs at the U.S. center who had offshored work to India since its 2003 inception. In total, they gave us the names of 73 U.S. PEs. In Mexico, we received a similar list with the names of 49 PEs. We then printed hard copies of the survey and physically went to the desks of all 122 PEs to ask them to fill out the survey. We received responses from all but three PEs in the U.S. and one PE in Mexico, resulting in 118 completed surveys (96 percent response rate).
We analyzed these survey responses in two ways. First, we submitted all 10 questions to an analysis of variance test to determine differences in PEs' responses across the two offshoring models. We averaged the three effectiveness scores from questions 8, 9, and 10 into a composite variable representing the PEs' overall assessment of effectiveness. Second, we regressed the four effectiveness variables (quality, speed, and time savings plus the overall assessment) against the frequencies with which PEs conducted the observed work practices to test if differences across the two models could account for differences in PEs' assessment of effectiveness.
Phase 3: Collection and Analysis of Project-Tracking Data
The final phase of data collection and analysis occurred fortuitously and gave us the opportunity to confirm the PEs' assessments and estimates on the surveys with similar effectiveness assessments that they had previously provided to their managers. A PE manager in the U.S. center gave us a project-tracking log of all the work that his PEs offshored to the India center over a two-year period. For each offshored task entered in the log, the manager had recorded four projecttracking variables with numeric values: (1) the number of hours the U.S. PE expected the task would take to complete; (2) the actual hours the task took to complete; (3) the number of hours the U.S. PE spent redoing the Indian PE's work due to poor quality; and (4) the approximate number of hours the U.S. PE spent communicating with the coordinator to offshore the task. A fifth entry for each task reflected the U.S. PE's overall rating (on a five-point scale) of the India center's performance on that task. In total, this log tracked 104 offshored tasks. After some probing, we discovered that a manager in the Mexico center had kept a similar log over the same twoyear period tracking 59 jobs.
From the data in the logs we created a sixth variable, the delayed completion time, to capture the amount of time a task required for completion in excess of the sending PE's original estimate. To calculate this value, we subtracted the expected number of hours to complete the task from the actual number of hours it took to complete the task. Positive values represented how long the sending PE had to wait for his results beyond his expectation for task completion. Negative values indicated how much sooner than expected a sending PE received the completed work. We employed analysis of variance tests on the log data to determine differences across sites and regression analyses to correlate the four project-tracking variables with the overall performance rating. We then compared these results with the results obtained by the survey.
Findings
Our qualitative analysis of the activities performed by PEs and coordinators in the U.S. and PEs in Mexico identified five offshoring work practices related to knowledge transfer between the home and offshore sites among individuals who shared artifacts that they created and modified with transformational technologies. Three work practices (defining requirements, monitoring progress, and fixing returns) were common to both Mexico's direct-interfacing model and the gate-keeping model of the U.S. center and were aimed, respectively, at helping the Indian PEs act on and interpret artifacts created with CAD and CAE technologies, spotting interpretation and other knowledge-related problems early, and managing the consequences when mistakes in interpretation or knowledge application were made. At the U.S. center, coordinators, not PEs, enacted these three work practices. At the Mexico center, which lacked coordinators, PEs enacted them.
Coordinators in the United States also enacted two other work practices (routing work strategically and filtering quality) that no PEs, either in Mexico or the United States, carried out. These work practices reflected the coordinators' ability to leverage their unique position to gain knowledge of the offshore site and to prevent awareness among U.S. PEs of Indian PEs' struggles in gaining and applying occupational knowledge. Strikingly, U.S. PEs enacted no substantive work practices associated with offshoring beyond providing brief task descriptions (as U.S. managers envisioned, unaware of the work undertaken by coordinators), a finding that is testament to how coordinators shielded U.S. PEs from all offshoring activities.
Three Work Practices Common to Both Offshoring Models
Defining Requirements
PEs in Mexico and the United States knew from experience, from standard practices developed in their centers, and from progress to date on their project the types of analyses they needed to conduct to test vehicle performance in any particular case. The type of analysis largely dictated the type and form of model to build. CAE technologies did not automatically develop the appropriate model upon specification of the required analysis because more than one kind of model could be generated from the same set of CAD files. PEs therefore had to judge for themselves which model should be built to meet analysis needs. For example, to run a frontal impact analysis a PE might have opted to build a model that was precise in its representation of the front of the vehicle but not the rear to reduce computation time while providing sufficiently detailed analytical results. A model, once built, might be modified to improve its replication of physical test results or to provide more detailed results for a specific area of the vehicle. Modification required that a PE could examine an existing model, determine what its creator intended, and decide how to improve it to meet a given objective. To do their work, PEs thus required both technical knowledge of how to set up a model for a given analysis and interpretive skills in how to decipher existing models.
Mexican PEs and U.S. coordinators quickly discovered that Indian PEs, lacking the same work experience, the same organizational knowledge, and the same awareness of the status of the project, needed to be explicitly told not only the type of analysis that was to be performed, but also the type of model to be built for it. Additionally, Indian PEs had to be told what types of changes ought to be made to the model should certain results obtain or errors occur. When the task was to alter an existing model, Indian PEs needed to be told what the model was intended for and how it should be modified.
The first work practice that Mexican PEs and U.S. coordinators therefore conducted to offshore tasks was to define task requirements by specifying in great detail what was to be done. 4 This PE was typical of Mexican PEs, who put together PowerPoint files with images and text to indicate precisely the types of issues to which the Indian PEs should pay attention.
By showing examples of past models and using text explanations to draw attention to specific model features, the Mexican PEs made explicit knowledge that was implicit in these artifacts and, in doing so, helped Indian PEs learn how to interpret such knowledge. The engineers used PowerPoint because the CAD and CAE technologies lacked text or memo creation capabilities for making explicit the implicit knowledge in existing models.
Typically, a work request in the United States was initiated when a PE called the coordinator on the phone, stopped by his desk, or sent an e-mail outlining very briefly the kind of task she wished to offshore. Thereafter, it was the coordinator's job to define the task requirements and send the resulting PowerPoint file to India. Coordinators followed up with phone calls to India nearly every day. In one instance, a coordinator (C) realized that the Indian PE was still not exactly clear on how to build the requested model even after receipt of the PowerPoint file and decided that what was needed were more examples in which implicit knowledge was made explicit for the Indian PE.
C: Is that OK?…I see….OK, well, I will define it more for you….I will put some more images in a PowerPoint so you can look at it and then I will also find a sample and put the sample on the ftp site…. OK. Thank you.
4
Defining requirements often necessitated interacting with DEs to confirm the CAD files, material properties, and number of welds. Mistakes in this information, if made locally when handing off the work to a collocated colleague, were easy enough to address because the DEs were close by; mistakes sent to India, however, delayed work while messages cycled back and forth for clarification. Problems of distance thus added to, but were not solely responsible for, the need for higher specificity and accuracy in defining requirements when offshoring work.
C: [He hangs up the phone and turns to the observer.] This is going to take me a lot of time. I'm happy to help, but this will be intensive.
Spelling out exactly what needed to be done and how, including what to look out for and what to do in the event of various types of problems, proved challenging for the Mexican PEs and U.S. coordinators because particularities of the vehicle design (including emerging problems with the design itself) rendered each task unique and its requirements idiosyncratic. The same level of detail would not have been required if the sending PE had done the work himself because not only did he already know what to do, he also did not need to think through every possible contingency, just the ones that actually arose.
Monitoring Progress
One indication that Indian PEs might be having problems creating, interpreting, and acting on artifacts was if they missed deadlines for returning work to the home sites. Because the Indian PEs were not just down the hall, the Mexican PEs and U.S. coordinators had no casual encounters with them that might have conveyed progress information nor could they observe them at work. Moreover, because the Indian PEs employed their own set of CAE technologies and kept their intermediate files on their own servers halfway around the globe, individuals at the home sites had no electronic means of inspecting work in progress. Thus, a second practice conducted by Mexican PEs and U.S. coordinators was to actively monitor the progress of tasks by sending emails and by making phone calls to India. The following type of exchange between a U.S. coordinator (C) and an Indian PE (I) was common: Monitoring progress served the additional purpose of conveying to the Indian PEs organizational knowledge about the importance of meeting deadlines in vehicle development, which if missed could cause programs to run over budget by millions of dollars and risk program cancellation. Thus, Mexican PEs and U.S. coordinators would often call and leave a voicemail message not so much hoping for an immediate response, but to signal to Indian PEs that the deadline was approaching and they were awaiting results.
Fixing Returns
CAE technologies featured error-checking algorithms that helped engineers find potential problems in models. However, the algorithms could not address all errors in a model; in particular, they could not detect errors in models that were technically sound, but that failed to reflect the assumptions or meet the requirements of a particular analysis. Mistakes of this nature often arose in models and analyses prepared by the Indian PEs, either because they did not fully understand the task requirements or because the requirements were poorly defined and communicated. Occasionally, rework was needed as the result of mistakes made by Indian PEs whose dearth of product knowledge, rather than more universal occupational knowledge, left them 5 A mesh is the name for a finite element model in which surfaces are divided into elements shaped as small triangles or rectangles upon whose nodes subsequent computations will be made. To mesh is to create such a model. unfamiliar with the normal configuration of a vehicle. One coordinator recalled how he received from India a model of a fuel system on a truck with a fuel-fill pipe and door on both sides of the vehicle. The Indian PE had taken advantage of the CAE tool's mirror function to reflect the first half of his model to create the second half, thereby reducing his modeling effort. In so doing, however, the Indian PE had failed to recognize that vehicles sport the fuel system outlet on only one side.
For Mexican PEs, fixing returned work from India undermined their confidence in the occupational knowledge and skills of Indian PEs. One informant noted, "It just seems that they don't pay attention to detail. Either that or their skills are not very good." Another Mexican PE commented that rework issues made him think twice about offshoring work: "The question is, should I send something at all if I know I'll have to fix it?" Such issues did not concern U.S coordinators, who viewed it as their job to review and fix work that came back from India if they had the time to do so. Additionally, the coordinators' backgrounds as contractors from Indian consulting firms provided them with knowledge of engineering organizations in their home country that prompted structural rather than individual attributions. One coordinator said, "I know these guys [Indian PEs] 
are crunched for time, so I try to help them out by fixing little things."
Two Work Practices Unique to the U.S. Gate-Keeping Model
In addition to carrying out the three practices common to both the Mexico direct-interfacing model and the U.S. gatekeeping model, U.S. coordinators enacted two other work practices that Mexican and U.S. PEs did not: routing tasks strategically and filtering quality. Unlike the three work practices common to both models, which revolved around knowledge transfer from the home site to the offshore site, the practice of routing tasks strategically was enabled by the transfer of knowledge of project status, staffing levels, and workload from the offshore site to the home site. The second practice uniquely performed by coordinators, filtering quality, reflected how coordinators stopped knowledge of the Indian PEs' success or failure in acquiring occupational knowledge from spreading within the home site to the U.S. PEs.
Routing Tasks Strategically
Neither the Mexican PEs nor the U.S. coordinators employed any kind of project management tool to make knowledge of workloads transparent across sites. As a result, Mexican PEs, who only handled the offshoring of their individual tasks and thus never developed a broader perspective of how much work was being offshored across their center, had no way of knowing if the task they were offshoring was entering a partially or fully loaded system in India. Beyond providing additional information with which to judge whether delays were due to problems in interpreting and applying knowledge or if they were due to stretched resources, such knowledge would have helped the Mexican PEs to determine what tasks to offshore and when to do so. U.S. coordinators, by contrast, handled offshoring requests from multiple PEs and therefore developed a broader sense of how many different tasks were in queue. Moreover, the three coordinators at the U.S. center held a weekly conference call with Indian managers and PEs during which they learned the current workload level and workforce capacity in India. This knowledge of work status at both the Indian and U.S. centers enabled coordinators to route tasks strategically by "reserving" resources at the India center, as illustrated in this exchange between a coordinator (C) and an Indian manager (I): 
Filtering Quality
Coordinators in the United States took it as their mandate to return work from India to sending PEs that was nearly completely free from error. To achieve their goal, coordinators filtered the quality of returned work. Filtering entailed making a direct comparison between the requirements that the sending PE laid out and the model or analysis returned from India. Should a discrepancy appear between the two, coordinators regularly sent the work back to India for further revision. Consequently, U.S. PEs rarely saw a model that was returned directly from India and therefore saw few errors in the work of the Indian PEs.
By filtering quality, coordinators prevented U.S. PEs from gaining knowledge of the quality of Indian work (beyond noting the time taken to do the task) and thus curtailed any questioning of the knowledge or skills of the India PEs. The coordinators' practice of filtering quality was thus in part a strategic maneuver left over from the early days of offshoring work from the U.S. center, when coordinators had to "sell" the capabilities of their respective consulting firms to the PEs. But after IAC built the India center in 2003 and hired as regular employees most of the engineers who staffed it, the need to sell consulting services became less important. Yet, coordinators found it difficult to dispense with their objective because they had come to believe that the essence of their job was to make offshoring between the United States and India seamless for U.S. PEs. In the coordinators' eyes, any time a U.S. PE was unhappy with work returned from India, the coordinator had not done his job effectively.
Confirmation of Qualitative Findings Across All U.S. and Mexican PEs
To confirm the results of our qualitative analysis regarding work practices, we triangulated our observation and interview data with the survey and project-tracking data. Recall that we surveyed all PEs at the U.S. and Mexico centers that had offshored work, at least once, to India, but we conducted observations of and interviews with only a subset of these engineers. We reasoned that if our findings generalized to all PEs, then we should see a significant difference across the entire population in the frequency with which U.S. and Mexican PEs conducted the first three work practices (defining requirements, monitoring progress, and fixing returns). If coordinators enacted these practices and made the process seamless for U.S. PEs, then U.S. PEs would not have to engage in these practices. Mexican PEs, on the other hand, had no coordinators to help them and thus would have to conduct these three practices themselves. Further, we expected that there would be no difference in the frequency with which either U.S. PEs or Mexican PEs conducted the final two work practices (routing tasks strategically and filtering quality) because coordinators were the primary individuals to conduct these two work practices, as opposed to PEs.
The descriptive statistics and survey data ANOVAs summarized in Table 3 , Panel A, show precisely these results. According to these self-reports, Mexican PEs enacted defining, monitoring, and fixing practices much more frequently than did U.S. PEs. There were no significant differences, however, in the frequencies with which these groups conducted routing or filtering practices. The survey findings indicate that coordinators conducted practices that freed up time for U.S. PEs, whereas Mexican PEs had to conduct these practices themselves, which took time away from their other work. Further, U.S. PEs benefited from routing and filtering practices, but Mexican PEs did not.
The data provided by the project-tracking logs suggest similar differences in the conduct of the five work practices. The logs contained estimates from PEs in both the United States and Mexico of the amount of time they spent "communicating" with Indian PEs for a particular task and how long they spent "reworking" that task once they received it from India. Our interviews with the managers in the United States and Mexico who maintained these logs indicated that they defined communication to include the amount of time PEs spent "preparing" a task to be sent, "confirming" that the Indian PEs understood the requirements, and "checking up on the status" of a task that was underway. Thus, the communication estimate in the project-tracking logs seems to capture both the "defining requirements" and "monitoring progress" practices uncovered in our qualitative data. Similarly, managers defined reworking as the amount of time a PE spent "fixing" the quality of the returned task. This rework variable thus captured the essence of the "fixing returns" practice we identified above. Table 3 , Panel B, displays the results of the ANOVAs for these two variables. 6 The results are in line with the survey results in that they indicate significant differences in the amount of time U.S. and Mexican PEs spent communicating about (similar to defining requirements and monitoring progress in the survey data) and reworking tasks (similar to fixing returns in the survey data) that that they had offshored.
U.S. and Mexican PEs' Perceptions of Effectiveness of the Offshoring Model
If the U.S. and Mexican PEs involved in offshoring were spending considerably different amounts of time defining task requirements in ways that meticulously spelled out knowledge, monitoring progress to ensure understanding on the part of Indian PEs, and fixing mistakes in returned work that reflected gaps in knowledge or understanding, it stood to reason that they might also have differing perceptions of the effectiveness of the offshoring arrangement. We therefore first used ANOVAs to test for differences in the U.S. and Mexican PEs' survey ratings of effectiveness in terms of qual-6 The project-tracking logs did not capture the routing or filtering practices conducted by coordinators. The logs were created and maintained by PE managers, who were largely unaware that the coordinators were conducting these less visible practices. ity of tasks returned, speed with which tasks were returned, and time savings of offshoring work. The results are displayed in Table 4 , Panel A. On the whole, U.S. PEs rated effectiveness significantly higher than Mexican PEs did across all three metrics, even controlling for the number of years a PE had spent offshoring work and the number of tasks she had offshored. Although the project-tracking logs assessed effectiveness with only one variable (the 5-point rating of performance for each task), the results for these data replicate these findings, as shown in Table 4 , Panel B. Irrespective of the amount of time a task was late from its expected completion date (delayed completion time), U.S. PEs rated performance significantly higher than did Mexican PEs.
Next, to determine whether the conduct of the three work practices of defining requirements, monitoring progress, and fixing returns was related to PEs' effectiveness assessment, we regressed each of the three survey effectiveness variables and the composite variable (which we created by averaging values for the three surveyed criteria) against the frequency with which PEs reported participating in these work practices. 7 Table 5 , Panel A displays the results of the regression analyses on the survey data, which clearly show that the less time PEs engaged in defining, monitoring, or fixing practices, the higher they rated effectiveness, as indicated by the negative coefficients. In fact, the extent to which PEs enacted the three work practices explains nearly 30 percent of the variance in predicting effectiveness on the composite variable. 8 Thus, it seems that when PEs' work was organized under the U.S. gate-keeping model they were considerably more satisfied with the effectiveness of the offshoring arrangement than when their work was organized under the Mexican direct-interfacing model. 7 We did not include routing or filtering practices in the regression equation because our qualitative and survey data indicated that PEs-whether in United States or Mexico-did not conduct these two practices, which were the sole province of coordinators. However, running a separate analysis for the U.S. site only indicates that the practice of filtering was significantly correlated with perceived performance while the practice of strategic routing was not. This finding suggests that coordinators' practice of routing jobs to specific PEs at the India site may have only played a minor role in the success of the gate-keeping model. 8 One of the limitations of ethnographic research is that it is difficult to collect large samples. While we recognize that running separate regressions for the two offshoring models (e.g., direct-interfacing, gate-keeping) would have aided in interpretation, our small sample size precluded us from such analyses. However, the findings presented herein show the general trend of the results, which we hope future research will corroborate with a larger sample. We direct the reader to Tables 3a and 4a to determine the effects of differences on offshoring models with regard to frequency of work practices conducted and ratings of perceived effectiveness. To corroborate these findings, we ran a separate regression analysis for the data obtained from the project-tracking logs.
To determine whether the sending PEs' performance rating for given tasks could be linked to whether or not the tasks were completed before or behind schedule, we included "delayed completion time" as a control variable. We thus created three models, stepping each variable in at a time to observe the change in variance. We stepped the "communication time" variable in last because we believed that it really measured two different constructs (defining and monitoring) and thus would account for the largest portion of variance. The results, shown in Table 5 , Panel B, are highly consonant with those for the survey data: Regardless of whether or not a task was completed on time, a PE's performance rating was highly (negatively) correlated with the number of hours spent defining requirements, monitoring progress, and fixing returns.
Together the results of the surveys and project-tracking logs indicate that PEs were much more satisfied with the effectiveness of the offshoring arrangement when their work was organized under the gate-keeping model than when it was organized under the direct-interfacing model precisely because they were less involved with the day-to-day mechanics of offshoring. A U.S. PE confirmed this conclusion: "I mean so far this offshoring thing has been pretty easy." A Mexican PE explained his own dissatisfaction: 
Perceptions of Indian PEs at the Offshore Site
Whereas, from the perspective of the home site, the U.S. PEs were pleased with the offshoring arrangement thanks to the efforts on their behalf by the coordinators and the Mexican PEs were dismayed with the time that transferring knowledge to India took away from their other activities, from the perspective of the offshore site, the Indian PEs had exactly opposite perceptions and preferences. For the Indian PEs, the coordinators formed a barrier that separated them from the individuals with whom they most wanted to converse and from whom they wanted to learn. By contrast, the Mexican PEs were helpful instructors whose efforts the Indian PEs greatly appreciated. In short, as compared to the U.S. gatekeeping model, the Mexican direct-interfacing model yielded more opportunities for learning on the part of Indian PEs via direct knowledge transfer from the Mexican PEs. Over time, this learning paid dividends to the Indian PEs in the form of more complex and interesting tasks sent under the Mexican model.
Indian PEs often commented that although CAD and CAE technologies afforded the sending of files, the technologies did not provide capabilities for articulating the assumptions necessary for building and analyzing models. When these assumptions were incompletely stated in the PowerPoint file sent by a coordinator, which was often the case, Indian PEs had to contact the coordinator, who in turn contacted the sending PE, who then sent the necessary specifications and requirements to the coordinator, who forwarded them to the Indian PE. Beyond the obvious time delays inherent in these transactions, the gate-keeping model, in the eyes of the Indian PEs, placed an obstacle between them and the sending PE. This obstacle was problematic for at least two reasons. First, the Indian PEs feared inaccuracies in mediated exchanges because the coordinator with whom they had direct contact was not always an "expert" in the particular tasks he sent to India. These comments from two Indian PEs reflect that suspicion. An advantage of learning from overseas colleagues was, ultimately, the assignment of more challenging and interesting tasks. During our observations, Indian PEs frequently announced that they wished to receive larger and more complex tasks from PEs in the program-based centers. Larger, more complex tasks entailed a greater degree of analytical, as opposed to model-building, work. The former was considered more challenging, the latter more routine. By pushing Indian PEs to expand their skills, complex work afforded an opportunity for the Indian center to prove its worth as a regional engineering center and to ensure the status of Indian PEs as fully capable and knowledgeable IAC engineers.
The project-tracking logs we collected from the Mexican and U.S. centers provided a means to verify the Indian PEs' perceptions that they were more likely to gain larger and more complex tasks under the Mexican direct-interfacing model. One variable in the project-tracking log recorded the number of hours the sending PE estimated that the particular offshored task should take, which we used as an indicator of the size and complexity of the task. An ANOVA test indicated that this time estimate differed significantly across the two offshoring models (F = 43.07; d.f. = 1, 163; p < .001). Specifically, the average expected completion time for a task offshored by Mexican PEs was 125.6 hours as compared to 49.7 hours for tasks offshored by U.S. PEs. The tasks offshored to India through the direct-interfacing model were thus arguably much larger and more complex than the tasks offshored through the gate-keeping model, confirming the beliefs of the Indian PEs.
Discussion
We set out to show that transformational tools, which are enabling offshoring at the task rather than solely the functional level, but which have been largely overlooked in the literature on offshored and distributed work, may be prompting new kinds of knowledge transfer problems beyond those that have been identified in the context of communication and storage technologies. Our findings supported this contention by highlighting how individuals engaged in taskbased offshoring found themselves having to transfer occupational knowledge across time and space. We reported how U.S. coordinators and Mexican PEs at the home sites created three work practices (defining requirements, monitoring progress, and fixing returns) that revolved around transferring primarily occupational knowledge, and to a lesser extent product and organizational knowledge, to the offshore site. For the Mexican PEs, having to carry out these practices required time that they thought they were saving by offshoring tasks and ultimately detracted from their perceptions of the effectiveness of the offshoring arrangement. U.S. coordinators created two other practices (routing tasks strategically and filtering quality) that reflected, respectively, transferring knowledge from the offshore site to the home site and preventing knowledge of Indian PEs' success or failure in acquiring knowledge from spreading within the home site. All five practices arose solely because transformational technologies were employed to facilitate the offshoring of engineering tasks that would otherwise have been completed by the sending engineers at the home sites. By broadening the research lens to include the full suite of IT employed in work, and in so doing examining the new forms of offshored and distributed work arrangements that transformational technologies make possible, our study contributes to theory on knowledge transfer among individuals working across time and space. Our findings also have practical implications for managing task-based offshoring arrangements.
Contributions to Theory
Our study begins its contribution to theory by expanding the set of possible knowledge transfer problems that can arise in offshored and distributed work. Over the last decade, numerous studies have highlighted problems, such as creating mutual knowledge and conveying contextual knowledge, that arise when individuals working across time and space employ communication and storage technologies (e.g., Cramton 2001; Griffith et al. 2003; Majchrzak et al. 2005) . Our study adds to this literature by demonstrating that, in the context of transformational technologies, problems may also arise in the transfer of technical knowledge within an occupation. The transfer of occupational knowledge was necessary in the face of an expertise differential between the home sites and the offshore site that is common in offshoring arrangements, even though most studies of IT outsourcing and offshoring overlook this knowledge disparity in favor of the need to transfer firm-specific work practices, needs, and specifications (Apte et al. 1997; Dibbern et al. 2004; Quinn 2000; Quinn and Hilmer 1994) . Our study makes clear that the structural configuration that is arguably the simplest of distributed work arrangements (one without cross-functional boundaries, within the same occupation, with individuals employing identical technologies, and therefore with a bedrock of mutual knowledge) is in fact rife with problems in transferring knowledge across time and space. To remedy these problems, individuals in our study enacted new work practices, a finding that underscores Orlikowski and Iacano's (2001) call to bear in mind that IT and work practices work in conjunction with one another to make alternative work arrangements succeed.
This contribution of our work is best understood in the context of work by Carlile (2004) , who in writing about knowledge transfer specified three types of knowledge boundaries between actors or groups: syntactic boundaries (which require only the transfer of knowledge, the meaning of that knowledge is clear to both parties), semantic boundaries (which require that knowledge be translated as well as transferred because its meaning is not universally understood), and pragmatic boundaries (which further require that knowledge be transformed in light of different interests and goals among actors). This typology of boundaries is helpful in thinking about the problems IAC engineers faced in transferring implicit knowledge in the models and analyses that they shared.
At IAC, managers chose to offshore work to the engineering center in India because the region boasted a highly skilled labor force trained in disciplines traditionally associated with automotive engineering (i.e., structural and mechanical engineering). IAC managers believed that this university training, complemented with the Indian engineers' ample skills in using the CAD and CAE technologies, guaranteed that the Indian engineers would be able to interpret the implicit knowledge embodied in work artifacts. As a result, knowledge would only have to be transferred, not translated or transformed, when sent offshore. In terms of Carlile's framework, IAC managers believed that the structural decision to offshore work would create a syntactic boundary that could be easily overcome: Artifacts would be produced at the home sites via transformational technologies and then transferred via communication or storage technologies to the offshore site, where the knowledge they embodied would then be easily and reliably interpreted.
The problem that IAC managers did not foresee was that although the Indian engineers possessed what Black, Carlile and Repenning (2004) deemed operational knowledge, namely knowledge of how to use transformational technologies (e.g., how to build a mesh or run an analysis), they lacked what these authors termed diagnostic knowledge, or the ability to interpret the output of the tool (e.g., how to look at a mesh and understand why it was built the way it was or how to look at an analysis and understand why it was set up the way it was). In other words, although Indian engineers were equally as proficient as Mexican and U.S. engineers in terms of general engineering knowledge and had equal skills in the use of CAD and CAE technologies, their relative dearth of occupational knowledge in automotive engineering, of organizational knowledge about engineering work practices in IAC, and of product knowledge of vehicles hampered their ability to interpret the implicit knowledge embodied in artifacts. This knowledge imbalance created a semantic boundary across which diagnostic knowledge not only had to be transferred, but also had to be translated into a "common lexicon" (Carlile 2004, p. 558 ) that could be interpreted by the Indian engineers.
Semantic boundaries are not new in studies of offshored and distributed work: What makes our study unusual is the type of knowledge that was needed to cross this boundary. Most distributed teams researchers who have documented knowledge transfer across semantic boundaries describe individuals who attempt to communicate knowledge that is sticky (Belanger 1999; Janssens 1995) , contextual (Alavi and Tiwana 2002; Cramton 2001) , or situated (Griffith et al. 2003; Sole and Edmondson 2002) . The stickiness, contextuality, or situatedness of the knowledge in these studies is what makes transfer difficult and what prompts the need for translation. By contrast, the knowledge that the home site engineers in our study needed to transfer was specific occupational, organizational, and product knowledge that originally was implicitly embodied in artifacts, but ultimately had to be made explicit.
The knowledge was not sticky, contextual, or situated: The sending engineers did not, for example, have difficulty extracting this knowledge from its environment, replacing local jargon enmeshed in it, or expressing it in terms suitable for a foreign culture. As evidence, a detailed set of task instructions sent from Mexico was indistinguishable from such a set sent from the United States; in short, the knowledge that had to be made explicit was universal in application (United States, Mexico, India) if not in possession (United States, Mexico).
Carlile (2004) argued that in the case of semantic boundaries, transformational technologies such as CAD and CAE technologies may aid in knowledge transfer. Our study demonstrates that rather than helping bridge a semantic boundary, transformational technologies used in the context of expertise differentials across time and space contributed to a semantic boundary, which engineering knowledge had to cross. Faced with the clear evidence that, by leaving as implicit that which needed to be explicit, the CAD and CAE technologies and their artifacts could not fully convey the knowledge required by the Indian engineers, the Mexican engineers and U.S. coordinators turned to another mechanism for translating knowledge: They created new work practices. These individuals learned that extra effort was necessary to define requirements thoroughly and completely. When work was returned, U.S. coordinators filtered quality to identify the misunderstandings that resulted in mistakes and to send task artifacts back for rework. Often, sending individuals simply identified problems and fixed the returns themselves.
It is not uncommon for individuals to create new work practices in response to changing organizational structures. Barley and Kunda (2001) suggested that new work practices arise when the demands of a situation become out-of-step with new organizational forms. Offshoring is clearly an important organizational change in which the structure and content of work distribution is dramatically altered for gains in efficiency, cost, and knowledge acquisition. In the case of IAC, the addition of the India center was a structural organizational change that created a syntactic boundary; the deployment of transformational tools to allow tasks to be offshored created a semantic boundary. Our findings indicated that new work practices emerged to help engineers cross these boundaries.
Many researchers have suggested that work practices often serve as filters with which to interpret the functionality of an information technology (Boudreau and Robey 2005; Orlikowski 2000; Vaast and Walsham 2005) . Our findings suggest that while the effectiveness of CAE tools was based on the ways in which those tools helped an engineer to accomplish her routine work, the relationship between work and technology may be more interdependent than previously thought. New work practices arose in response to new boundaries, which were themselves the outcomes of organizational and technological change. New work practices such as defining, monitoring, fixing, strategic routing, and filtering created avenues through which occupational domain knowledge could be transferred and translated from the home site to the less expert offshore site. By enabling a context in which implicit knowledge embedded in transformational technologies could be made explicit, these new work practices augmented the functionality of the technologies used to offshore work.
Using these work practices to make implicit knowledge explicit requires time and effort, as the U.S. coordinators and Mexican engineers well attested. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have long referred to this problem as the "common-sense problem," arguing that it is difficult and cumbersome to explain to a person or a machine that has little or no prior knowledge of a practice all of the basic steps it is necessary to take to perform that practice (McCarthy 1990; Minsky 1995) . In accordance with the common-sense problem, the sending engineers in our study struggled not with making articulate something they knew innately, tacitly, or holistically, but rather with putting down in writing the vast troves of specific domain knowledge that guided their work and decision making. Due to their direct-interfacing arrangement, Mexican engineers wound up spending a significant portion of their time attempting to make explicit to Indian engineers this knowledge. But Mexican engineers faced the pressure of impending project deadlines and thus grew frustrated that they had to spend time "teaching" the Indian engineers. U.S. engineers were buffered from having to teach by the structure of the gate-keeping arrangement, which put coordinators in their place. However, because Indian engineers recognized that the knowledge they needed to obtain had a strong occupational component, they questioned the coordinators' ability to teach them.
This response to the coordinators is worth considering in light of Carlile's (2004) suggestion that knowledge brokers might act as another aid in addition to transformational technologies for crossing semantic boundaries.
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To the uninformed observer, the U.S. coordinators in the gate-keeping model 9 Carlile (2004) also suggested that work practice transparency as described by Lave and Wenger (1991) could facilitate knowledge transfer across semantic boundaries. In the case of task-based offshoring, however, work practice transparency is nearly impossible because the learner is critically separated by time and space from the knowledgeable members of the community of practice from whom he needs to learn, hence we do not discuss it.
would seem uniquely positioned to translate knowledge to the less experienced offshore engineers. However, the U.S. coordinators did not act as knowledge brokers in the sense that their structural position suggested might have been possible primarily because coordinators were not expert in the specific domain knowledge that needed to be translated. Research on knowledge brokering suggests that individuals who can effectively move knowledge from one domain to another must have sufficient expertise in both domains to be able to translate that knowledge (Barley and Bechky 1994; Carlile 2002 ). Due to their lack of specific occupational knowledge, U.S. coordinators could transfer but not translate knowledge; in other words, they could cross syntactic but not semantic boundaries. Thus, when Indian engineers ran into problems interpreting the implicit knowledge embodied in the artifacts produced with the transformational technologies, coordinators actually acted not as knowledge brokers, but as knowledge blockers who prevented direct access to knowledgeable U.S. engineers.
What coordinators did do, though, was to facilitate the transfer of situated and contextual knowledge from the home site to the offshore site and then back again. In this sense, coordinators provided the important function suggested by offshoring researchers of communicating information about workload and staffing discrepancies as well as negotiating time zone differences (Carmel 2006; Rottman and Lacity 2004) . Because coordinators sat structurally in a position that overarched several engineering domains, they were also able to use the contextual knowledge of workloads to route tasks strategically, a practice that allowed them to share and leverage contextual knowledge related to the status of forthcoming as well as existing tasks.
Implications for Practice
The extent to which sending engineers in our study were free from having to enact new work practices to translate knowledge for the engineers offshore predicted their assessment of the effectiveness of the offshoring arrangement. Hence, engineers working under the gate-keeping model were more satisfied with the arrangement than were engineers working under the direct-interfacing model because work in the former model was organized such that coordinators rather than engineers had to enact the new work practices. Yet, engineers at the offshore site relied on the sending engineers to translate the knowledge necessary to perform tasks and learned the most when the sending engineers were actively involved in defining requirements and fixing returned work. Consequently, the direct-interfacing model, which put Indian engineers in direct contact with the sending Mexican engineers, was highly valued by Indian engineers.
Learning takes time and effort for both learners and teachers. Because sending engineers were the only realistic teachers in our study, learning meant taking a productivity hit as sending engineers diverted attention from their own tasks to teach offshore engineers. These findings point to a potential difficulty in task-based offshoring arrangements: The organization of work most effective at helping offshore workers to learn (and thereby alleviate an expertise imbalance) may be in direct opposition to the organization of work that is most efficient for those sending work offshore. Thus, the question that managers of IT-enabled offshoring arrangements may have to ask is, for the effectiveness of the overall system, how should work be organized to strike a balance between learning versus short-term productivity?
In a situation of expertise imbalance, a model of offshoring that facilitates learning may be best for the overall system initially even if it were to lower the short-term productivity of home site individuals. The need for explicit teaching ought to decrease as workers at the offshore site acquire the specific occupational knowledge necessary to competently perform work. Gradually, the semantic knowledge boundary between the home office and the offshore site would revert to a syntactic boundary: Individuals at the home site would no longer have to translate knowledge; instead, they would simply have to transfer it. At that point, the system ought to be ready for transition to a gate-keeping model in which thirdparty coordinators would manage the transfer of contextual knowledge offshore and transformational technologies would transfer implicit occupational knowledge that now can be interpreted without assistance by the offshore individuals.
Future Research
Limitations in a study often point to avenues for future research. In this regard, our study is no exception; we mention here four possible ways in which remedying limitations in our study might provide useful insights. First, we gathered no cost data and thus could not compare the two models of offshoring beyond assessing perceptions of effectiveness among the individuals involved. Coordinators lightened the sending engineers' workload, but the staffing cost associated with coordinators was a clear trade-off against the engineers' satisfaction with the gate-keeping model. Future studies might provide more comprehensive assessments of effectiveness. Second, future research might examine the extent to which knowledge transfer problems arise in conjunction with transformational technologies and task-based offshoring when expertise is evenly distributed. We found that an expertise imbalance was a strong contributor to problems of transferring knowledge, which leaves open the possibility that other factors may have been overshadowed by this large effect or, alternatively, that few problems arise in conjunction with transformational technologies employed across time and distance when all parties are knowledgeable and capable users. Third, no pragmatic boundaries as described by Carlile (2004) were apparent in our study, perhaps because we examined offshoring in the context of a single function. Studies of cross-functional teams that share a suite of transformational technologies and their artifacts may uncover pragmatic boundaries and, with them, new knowledge transfer problems. Finally, studies of occupational settings beyond engineering are likely to add to the set of work practices we identified that support knowledge transfer and that help to overcome the problems that arise in the context of using transformational technologies to accomplish joint work across time and space.
